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ABSTRACT 
Contemporary online environments suffer from a regulatory gap; 
that is there are few options for participants between customer 
service departments and potentially expensive court cases in 
foreign jurisdictions. Whatever form of regulation ultimately fills 
that gap will be charged with determining whether specific 
behavior, within a specific environment, is fair or foul; whether 
it’s cheating or not. However, cheating is a term that, despite 
substantial academic study, remains problematic. Is anything the 
developer doesn’t want you to do cheating? Is it only if your 
actions breach the formal terms of service? What about the 
community norms, do they matter at all? All of these remain 
largely unresolved questions, due to the lack of public 
determination of cases in such environments, which have mostly 
been settled prior to legal action. 
In this paper, I propose a re-branding of participant activity in 
such environments into developer-sanctioned, advantage play, and 
cheating. Advantage play, ultimately, is activity within the 
environment in which the player is able to turn the mechanics of 
the environment to their advantage without breaching the rules of 
the environment. Such a definition, and the term itself, is based on 
the usage of the term within the gambling industry, in which 
advantage play is considered betting with the advantage in the 
players’ favor rather than that of the house. 
Through examples from both the gambling industry and the 
Massively Multiplayer Role-Playing Game Eve Online, I consider 
the problems in defining cheating, suggest how the term 
‘advantage play’ may be useful in understanding participants 
behavior in contemporary environments, and ultimately consider 
the use of such terminology in dispute resolution models which 
may overcome this regulatory gap. 
 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.4.2 [Computers and Society] social issues, K.4.m [Computers 
and Society] miscellaneous, K.8.0 [Personal Computing] games. 
General Terms 
Management, Design, Human Factors. 
Keywords 
Virtual Worlds, Games, Design, Regulation, Dispute Resolution, 
Gambling. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A constant challenge in gaming generally, but one with significant 
application to virtual worlds, is the attempt to define cheating. 
Whilst the subject of much study, in practice it can often be 
difficult to differentiate those cheating from those seeking to 
optimize their participation in an environment. Given that 
developer sanctioned play is of little interest in the context of 
regulation or dispute resolution, it does remain important to 
distinguish between ‘cheating’ and merely players pushing the 
boundaries of accepted behavior. Whether the use of artificial 
player aids, utilizing a software exploit, or defrauding other 
players, it can often be difficult to define the boundary at which 
an activity becomes cheating. A software overlay may be ‘fair’, 
whilst utilizing a bot is ‘foul’, an exploit may be fair game until 
such time as it is sufficiently exploited for the developer to put 
forth a notice, and scamming other players may be perfectly 
acceptable until you gain access to their account. In each case, 
until a precedent is set, and perhaps even subsequently, some may 
consider the activity ‘cheating’ whilst others merely consider it 
smart use of the tools afforded to the player. 
As Myers [24] exposed in his play of the avatar ‘Twixt’, in many 
cases this results from an unclear definition as to exactly what 
constitutes cheating in any given aspect of a game experience and, 
in some cases, differences in opinion amongst participants and 
between participants and platform operators, ultimately leading to 
disputes which customer service departments or game-masters 
have to arbitrate. In this paper, I argue that such disputes centre 
on a difference between what participants may perceive as 
‘cheating’, and activity which could instead be termed – to borrow 
 
 
 
a phrase from the gambling industry – advantage play, and that 
such a definition aids us both in differentiating between the two 
activities, and in resolving disputes which centre upon them. As 
authors such as Koster [18] have noted, participants naturally look 
for ways to optimize their behavior in gaming environments. This, 
in turn leads to players blurring the boundary between optimizing 
within the rules, and operating outside of those rules, a significant 
factor for both companies and regulators in deciding how to 
design and implement regulations. 
There is a long history of disputes of a similar nature in the 
offshore gambling industry, which did not stem merely from the 
refusal of particular operators to pay owed funds, though this was 
a frequent cause, but also from ambiguity around formal terms of 
service, community norms and player behavior. Those serving as 
mediators throughout the history of the offshore gambling 
industry have frequently been asked to differentiate between 
advantage play and cheating, and a significant number of these 
disputes; particularly in the casino and poker industries, but also 
in sports betting are centered on participants using automated 
methods to maximize the amount bet on positive expectation (i.e. 
profitable) bets. These disputes are remarkably similar to the type 
of disputes increasingly observed in contemporary online 
environments, and I will describe examples from both industries 
in the sections that follow, as well as consider an example from 
Eve Online in which participants have developed software to 
automate actions within the environment to maximize collection 
of resources. 
2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Cheating remains a difficult term to define, and particularly so in 
contemporary gaming environments. It is a term frequently used 
to represent a range of situations including where players do not 
understand the reason they are losing to a (supposedly) less 
skilled opponent, and where players are exploiting a bug. Caillois 
[3], Huizinga [16] and more recent work by Consalvo [8] have all 
contributed to the literature on cheating, however, I believe a 
distinction between cheating and advantage play, based on 
observations of the offshore gambling industry, is more suitable 
for contemporary online environments.  
Essentially, such a definition returns to the work of play theorists 
such as Huizinga [16] and Caillois [3], as well as the more recent 
work of Crawford [9] and Koster [2] to understand that players 
are by nature competitive, and will try to find the optimal solution 
for any given problem; many of those solutions are within all 
known rules (advantage play), however, some transgress them 
(cheating). This border is constantly in flux as operators revise 
their rules, and communities revise their norms, in response to 
past actions. 
Huizinga [16, p11] argues that “[a]s soon as the rules are 
transgressed the whole play-world collapses”, but differentiates 
between those who overtly ignore the rules and those who appear 
to be honoring them whilst subverting the game, stating that the 
“player who trespasses against the rules or ignores them is a 
‘spoil-sport’. The spoil-sport is not the same as the false player, 
the cheat, for the latter pretends to be playing the game and, on 
the face of it, still acknowledges the magic circle”.  
As in my distinction between cheating and advantage play, 
Huizinga notes that cheating may itself be a form of competition, 
noting that “[a]rchaic culture, however, gives the lie to our moral 
judgment in this respect, as does the spirit of popular lore” [16, 
p52], citing the case of the hare and the hedgehog in which the 
hedgehog, seen as the good-guy, wins by what we might refer to 
as cheating. This seems to provide substance to an argument that 
there has always been a degree of uncertainty as to how to 
describe utilizing loopholes in the games structure, and external 
aids, to attempt to win a game. 
Caillois [3, p45] defines both cheats and professional players as 
corruptors of the game, arguing that those who are not satisfied by 
the games mechanics turn to alternative means to find an outlet 
for their play: “The cheat is still inside the universe of play. If he 
violates the rules of the game, he at least pretends to respect 
them... he safeguards and proclaims the validity of the 
conventions he violates, because he is dependent upon others 
obeying the rules. If he is caught, he is thrown out. The universe 
of play remains intact. Neither does the professional player 
change the nature of the game in any way. To be sure, he himself 
does not play, but merely practices a profession” [3, p45].    
A number of the more difficult issues in online environments are 
essentially attempting to form a definition of cheating. Whilst 
developers may argue that “anything we tell you not to do” is 
cheating, the emergent nature of such environments results in 
players continually seeking new ways to gain an advantage. 
Whilst a portion of the player base often sees real money trading 
as cheating, that is generally a binary determination: a player 
either participated in real money trading or they did not, which 
was either a breach of the terms of service or was not. Often 
though, cheating is harder to define, and companies are unable to 
create terms of service that reacts to each of the possible ways in 
which participants could interact with the environment. Taylor [7, 
p136] refers to this as ‘(il)legitimate play’, and highlights the 
difficulty with identifying such behavior by noting that once 
developers “put a product out there the players will do with it 
what they will, often playing in ways the designers never 
anticipated”. Similarly, Mulligan & Patrovsky [23, p217] note 
“Developers spend years focused on making a game. If they’re not 
careful, this will breed certain assumptions, such as the world they 
created will remain their world and the players will play the game 
the way the creators want it played. That will not happen. Players 
have their own motivations and objectives”. 
Koster [19] in a list of “laws of online world design”, collected 
from a range of authors on the MUD-Dev mailing list, offers two 
contributions from Caliban Tiresias Darklock. Darklock’s First 
Law states (abridged) “Cheating is an apparently advantageous 
violation of player assumptions about the game. When those 
assumptions are satisfied, all apparently advantageous methods 
are fair. When they are violated, no apparently advantageous 
methods are fair”. Defining ‘player assumptions’ here requires an 
understanding of the norms developed within the environment, 
most likely as a result of negotiation between and among users 
and developers. In doing so it serves to highlight the limitations of 
a ‘one size fits all’ approach to regulation which may result from 
formalized, top-down, regulatory and dispute resolution 
mechanisms; what one player community considers ‘fair’ may be 
‘foul’ in another.  
Darklock’s second law argues, “Any violation of player 
assumptions is bad. “This follows from the first law because 
allowing violation of player assumptions is — pathologically — a 
unilateral ‘license to cheat’. When you license any player to 
violate the assumptions of others, you imply a right for ALL 
players to violate the assumptions of others, and they will attempt 
to do so in an apparently advantageous fashion. This turns your 
player base into a society of cheaters, under the umbrella of truths 
we hold to be self-evident”. This law contains a problematic 
conclusion, for it is likely that any environment will have different 
groups of players with different norms. Almost certainly some 
norms from one group will violate those of another, and it is 
within these tensions that disputes are most likely to arise.  
Finally, it is important to note that rules are constantly in flux. 
They change when we, as players, find a game unbalanced, they 
change when companies find a software tool that is giving players 
an unfair advantage, they change when software developers 
discover a loophole that is giving one faction an advantage or 
when the operator of a multiplayer game discovers something is 
unbalancing the economy. All of these rule changes are brought 
about by players manipulating systems in a way that some would 
consider cheating, but it is worth considering whether they are 
simply an evolution of the environment itself. 
More recently, a range of authors have tackled governance in 
Online Games. Reynolds & de Zwart [30, p. 6] argue “that a 
number of things are likely to occur in the short term: Increased 
theft of virtual items; Increased third party sales of virtual items 
and related crimes e.g. credit card fraud; More players will seek 
legal remedies for publisher acts that they do not agree with; More 
judgments will be found in favour of players overturning EULA 
and copyright primacy; and, Policy makers and regulators will 
increasingly focus on the virtual items and currency – probably 
creating regulations that inadvertently harm at least one sector of 
the industry, thereby also harming citizens that enjoy participating 
in that sector”. 
The solution they propose is one which would mirror the 
governance of sport, based on the model of the Court for 
Arbitration in Sport, noting that “when cases do go to court they 
are judged contextually i.e. a court does not ask – did the rugby 
player hit the other player (as of course they did, they do all the 
time) but rather did they do so with intent and in a manner that is 
outside what would be reasonably expected given the context and 
rules of the sport” In this, it is possible to see strong parallels to 
the ‘magic circle’ concept. Reynolds and de Zwart note that what 
is key “is that all parties recognize both the centrality of game 
derived meaning, value and harms; and, recognize how the limits 
of those values are negotiated” [31, p. 7]. 
Through considering a range of in-world activities, Humphreys 
and de Zwart [17, p. 518] identify and describe a number of areas 
where community and codified norms may differ. The first of 
these is in ‘griefing’ activity; that is, behavior designed to be 
“malicious and damaging to the experience of other players” 
through a range of motivations. Such behavior, they argue, breaks 
the norms of the community rather than codified terms of service 
or interferes with the software itself, and this behavior may often 
be permitted under real-world law. 
They note that “sometimes there is a clear case for the consensual 
suspension of these rules, as when a game like EVE Online makes 
piracy and theft part of the gameplay” [p. 521], and argue that a 
number of different stakeholders within the environment each 
play a role in the governance process, with players governing 
community norms, game providers designating representatives to 
manage the players, publishers responsible for managing 
intellectual property infringements and governments with the 
authority to regulate the content of the game. In many ways, this 
mirrors the system described by Bartle [2], however Humphreys 
& de Zwart place greater emphasis on the “blurring of 
boundaries” between these stakeholders, and highlight the 
important role that ever changing participant behaviour has on 
managing the process, noting that such behaviour is “both hard to 
control and hard to predict” [p. 521-522].  
Lemley [21] draws comparisons between Virtual Worlds and 
early internet subculture, allowing comparisons to be made 
between contemporary gaming environments and other cultures 
developed online, as I do here with the offshore gambling 
industry. Specifically, he argues that the early internet was “a 
place inhabited by a small and relatively insular subculture that 
created its own set of norms [...] largely outside the view of the 
world at large” and that “it didn’t really matter what we did on the 
Internet because it was just the Internet. Bits – ones and zeros – 
didn’t have any real significance” [p. 576].  
Lemley argues that such an approach still persists in Virtual 
Worlds, and recounts a discussion with a federal judge he 
considers one of the more advanced in such topics, who stated 
that one could not defame an avatar “because it’s not real. It 
doesn’t actually mean anything”. Lemley argues that this is false 
and that “false and malicious” claims about the reputation of an 
avatar, or other online alias, would have the same reputational and 
psychological impact as if the claims were made about a real 
world identity. 
Finally, Lemley argues that the architecture, or design, of a virtual 
world shapes the behaviour of participants as least as much as the 
legal rules or social norms of the platform, whilst highlighting the 
difference between Virtual Worlds and other internet-based 
platforms. In the comparison of norms and governance in the 
offshore gambling industry and the MMOG EVE Online that 
follows, I highlight a number of these differences. 
Hickman & Hickman [15] consider the merits of alternative 
governance approaches for Virtual Worlds. They argue that there 
is a “perceived separation” between the real and the virtual, which 
they justify by comparing the behavioural norms in the real world 
to virtual world experiences. They argue that by opting into 
particular environments, and thus the norms of that environment, 
users “[signal] their otherness from the real world” [p. 549].  
The authors continue to discuss the significance of norms. 
They dismiss EULAs as “at heart, boilerplate rhetoric that may 
well be unenforceable under the actual law of the land” [p. 553], 
while noting that the costs of challenging EULAs in courts is 
likely to be greater than any proceeds from the challenge, making 
it unlikely for participants to challenge the document, and thus 
leaving the only remedy as choosing another platform with a less 
restrictive EULA. At the same time, they argue for the importance 
of community norms, noting that while new participants to the 
environment are likely to have their behaviour influenced by the 
interface and the EULA, eventually the community norms come to 
dominate. [p. 554] 
Hickman & Hickman suggest identifying the rules of each 
platform by combining formal agreements with community norms, 
arguing that users of the platform are likely to give equal weight 
to both the general social practices that they witness and the rules 
set by the publisher for the environment [p. 568]. Whilst both are 
significant, I would question whether they are equal, as the design 
of the environment, and the means through which the explicit 
rules are communicated to the user, would seem to alter the extent 
to which the two parts of the equation contribute to the users 
experience. 
They also discuss a community’s structure as a significant 
factor in the mode of governance under which it could 
successfully operate, noting that a hierarchical community, in 
which the users have specific roles and there are higher authorities 
to aspire to and consult, would seem “more amenable to self-
governance through shared norms than one ruled by fiat of the 
publishers” [p. 569]. In many ways, this reflects the situation in 
both Eve Online and the offshore gambling industry in which a 
group of users, through the creation and management of external 
news sources, blogs and/or forums, are able to influence a range 
of participants. 
As these approaches highlight, discussing Virtual Worlds in terms 
of community norms is by no means a unique approach. However, 
the case studies herein both confirm and contradict a number of 
the principles set out above, and in doing so highlight how we 
may identify norms and their value both to understanding the 
relevance of a particular governance approach and for establishing 
the precedents under which dispute resolution may apply in such 
spaces. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
The research draws specific case studies from both a gaming 
environment, Eve Online, and from the offshore gambling 
industry, with those cases selected through theoretical sampling, 
representing times when rules, norms, or a combination of the two 
were in dispute due to the actions of participants within the 
environment. Within each case, data was drawn from a number of 
sources; my own experiences, community blogs, forums and 
Twitter conversations in the public domain, official statements 
from company representatives and, on occasion, other academic 
accounts of events, archived, and, later, analysed and further 
explored iteratively as I established both common factors and 
differentials. One aspect of working with online gaming 
environments such as EVE Online is that access to areas of space 
is significantly restricted [34], and so an approach combining 
direct in-world experience with meta-analysis allowed more areas 
of the environment to be considered. 
My approach to selecting the environments to focus my research 
on, as well as the specific data within each environment to collect, 
was heavily influenced by readings in Grounded [7] and theory 
building from case studies [11,12,13]. Another significant 
influence was the work of Ostrom [25,26,27], and while the 
governance material was inspiring as a starting point for 
significant factors and challenges to self-regulation, a key take 
away from this approach was the importance of multiple case 
studies, both for initially forming and subsequently testing 
approaches to self-regulation in particular spaces.  
4. CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTS 
The approach of authors such as Caillois [3] does not seem to 
extend well to the type of contemporary online environment in 
which the majority of players are found, and in which the majority 
of material disputes currently arise. Firstly, the definition seems 
overly broad, as we could construe ‘alternative means’ to be 
anything from forums to wikis, add-ons to interface overlays, 
keyboard macros to fully automated bots.  Secondly, as with 
Bartle [1], such an approach is problematic; it is not the case in 
contemporary environments that professional players do not 
change the environment (or, as Bartle phrases it, exist in a 
different magic circle). Gold farmers have a direct effect on the 
economy by increasing the supply of resources, and in a game 
with legitimized real money trading it is hard to say that they are 
breaking the ‘conventions’ of the game, so long as they operate 
within the same rules as other players. 
Crawford [9, p39-40] notes “It’s easy to ruin a good challenge by 
exploiting loopholes in the rules. No matter how carefully you set 
up the challenge, somebody will think of a way to subvert your 
system. One solution to this problem is to write reams of rules to 
prevent every imaginable form of cheating”, arguing “players rely 
on simple rules and reject clever tricks that subvert the challenge 
of the game. “No fair!” is a cry that makes up for a lot of 
complicated rule-mongering”. In contemporary online 
environments of course, there are two problems with such an 
approach: the players may not know each other and are likely so 
geographically diverse that the social implications of Crawford’s 
“no fair” cry are unlikely to have impact upon their participants. 
Further, whilst developers and publishers can certainly “write 
reams of rules”, technical limitations may prevent their 
implementation; it is, for example, often hard to differentiate 
between sophisticated automated play and that of a human 
participant. 
Koster [18, p112] argues that cheating is a form of competition, 
noting that the human mind naturally seeks shortcuts, and that 
“once a player looks at a game and ascertains the pattern and the 
ultimate goal, they’ll try to find the optimal path to getting there 
[…] players often have little compunction about violating the 
theoretical ‘magic circle’”, or, more simply, “many players are 
willing to cheat”. His overall perspective – that this is natural and 
a sign of lateral thinking rather than a problem – is supported, he 
claims, by warfare, “where it [cheating] is acknowledged as one of 
the most powerful and brilliant of all military techniques”, 
concluding that by cheating, the player is “choosing a battlefield 
that is broader in context than the game itself ... From a strict 
evolutionary point of view, cheating is a winning strategy. 
Duelists who shoot first while their opponent is still pacing off are 
far more likely to reproduce. 
Koster [18, p114] also notes that designers and players struggle 
with defining cheating, but for him “it boils down to whether or 
not the extraneous action is one that resides within the magic 
circle”, noting the issue with players attempting to enforce rules 
which are not enforced by the technological system. He argues the 
preconception with gaming environments is “if the game permits 
it, then it’s legal” and that those attempting to solve this are 
“fighting a losing battle against a natural human tendency: to get 
better at things”. Dekoven [10] highlights other examples of this, 
noting that there are cases where players bend the rules to create a 
fairer environment. 
In online environments, where you have a multitude of human 
actors, these problems are only amplified. In the gambling 
industry, players and providers normally accept that players will 
attempt to do whatever they can to gain an advantage within the 
rules. Here the term rules actually refers to some form of 
composite between the written terms of service and industry 
norms, so as to prevent rules stating “If you deposit on a Tuesday, 
25% of your balance will be transferred to our Christmas party 
fund” (a hypothetical and extreme example). 
During my research period with Eve Online, two notable groups 
of issues proved problematic for CCP and participants alike. The 
first of these is exploits – i.e. the game software allowing a player 
to perform an activity not intended by the developers, and the 
second is the use of external products or macros to automate 
actions of the in-game experience.  
The use of such external aids is not new, and indeed Taylor [33, 
p137] describes the development of a product, EQ Macros, “that 
allowed players to record and play back keystrokes. According to 
its developers, the intended use was not to create unfair 
advantages but instead that ‘EQ Macros takes the grunt work out 
of playing EverQuest, and makes it more fun.’” Taylor also 
describes a tool by the same developers called Xylobot, which 
was a more generic tool that “included on-screen maps, 
waypoints, and auto-start options”, and notes that these 
applications were not free, though did provide trial versions. At 
the same time, players using “EQWindows or, more often, had 
second computers attached to the Internet, were able to use map 
sites and the vast helper databases available”.   
Players “found a range of functionality not proscribed by the 
game’s designers”, and that “with an abstract notion of “fair play” 
such helpers certainly could constitute cheating in the minds of 
some, though I think they are better seen as pointers to underlying 
design insufficiencies within the game itself or alternative play 
models deemed illegitimate or not fully accounted for” [33, 
p138]. One example of this was ShowEQ that, Taylor notes, was 
“deeply contested by both fellow players who do not use the 
program and EQ’s designers”. This software was a source of 
much debate, and Taylor noted, “Its existence prompts 
discussions about not only what fair play is, but what the 
legitimate bounds of the game are”.  
Sony did crack down on the use of automated scripts in the same 
way CCP subsequently have; issuing bans to those found using 
the scripts. However, the debate within gaming communities 
surrounding whether such action is cheating continues, and it 
would appear that amongst operators some use of artificial aids is 
considered fair game, akin to players optimizing their 
performance or advantage play, whilst others are seen as crossing 
the boundary to cheating – frequently when the artificial aid takes 
action for you. However, both exploits and the use of artificial 
aids are equally difficult to delineate – where is a player using 
their skills (in or out of game) to gain an advantage, and when are 
they cheating? If we acknowledge the use of Wiki’s and other 
tools, but ban automation, is the act of scripting what we are 
actually prohibiting. 
5. GAMBLING INDUSTRY 
The term ‘advantage play’ is used in the gambling industry to 
represent actions taken by participants who attempt to gain an 
advantage; that is, to make their bets profitable by overcoming the 
inherent house or bookmaker advantage on bets, whether casino, 
poker or sports. Participants are able to do this through the use of 
weaknesses in the gambling operators; be they technical (such as 
allowing related bets to be bet in a parlay) or mathematical (such 
as offering lines which are so out of line with the market 
consensus that they are subject to arbitrage). Importantly, 
however, they are able do this without breaching the codified 
terms and enforced guidelines.  
One application of the advantage play vs. cheating distinction in 
the gambling industry is the betting of correlated parlays (a form 
of multiple bet in which the payout is the product of the odds) on 
sporting events. In American Football, there is a clear and obvious 
link between the handicap spread on a particular match (e.g. USC 
-38) and the total (USC vs. Louisiana Tech over 42). Individually, 
each of these may be approximately 50/50 propositions, however 
if USC were to score enough points to cover the 38 point spread 
(that is, score 39 or more), then the chances of there being over 42 
total points in the match are significantly higher than 50%. 
Accordingly, in such cases it is possible to quantify the advantage 
that the player is obtaining by betting such a parlay; the advantage 
in the example given being much higher than if USC were 3-point 
favorites and the total was 60. This has allowed operators to, over 
time, draw up boundaries (often specific to each operation) at 
which they are willing to accept such parlays, defining those they 
allow as ‘advantage plays’ (which may result in the player 
eventually being limited or banned), and others as ‘cheating’, 
which they ideally refuse to accept, or, where software does not 
support such an option, subsequently void. 
However, there are also other examples that bear a closer 
resemblance to the types of issues that exist in contemporary 
online environments. Below, I highlight two software-based 
solutions which, for a number of years, allowed players to gain an 
advantage on platform operators; the first of which could be 
reasonably termed advantage play, whilst the latter would be 
considered cheating – however, until relatively recently, was 
largely undetectable.  
 For a period in the early 2000s, customers at Matchbook betting 
exchange were able to take advantage of delayed lines to obtain 
no-lose positions on sporting events. Matchbook, similar to 
Betfair in the European and Australian markets, allows players to 
bet on either side of a market and place bets that may be matched 
by another player in the future. Whilst the source of the original 
offers is a subject of some uncertainty, Matchbook have always 
had offers on both sides of popular markets during the hours 
before an event, which appear to be generated and updated 
automatically. In fact, it was evident that the offers were being 
generated using the XML feed of Pinnacle Sportsbook – a market 
leader for US-facing sports. Essentially, the XML feed provided a 
text feed of the current odds at Pinnacle, which player developed 
tools could then automatically place as offers on betting 
exchanges such as Matchbook. 
The weakness, and the opportunity for players, existed because 
Pinnacle only allowed periodic calls to their XML feed and – in 
any case – the XML feed itself appeared frequently delayed by 
some seconds. This, together with an existing market for live 
information filled by services such as G&J Update, Don Best and 
SportsOptions, meant that a relatively small number of 
participants had pricing information ahead of the Matchbook 
market. This allowed participants to place a bet on one side of the 
market when the prices changed, wait some seconds for the 
market to update once the change was reflected on the Pinnacle 
XML feed, and subsequently bet the other side for an immediate 
profit. This opportunity existed for a number of years until a 
change in the Matchbook commission structure resulted in players 
being charged a fee on each bet made; negating the advantage. 
Nonetheless, Matchbook paid all players without complaint.  
‘Casibot’, whose website still offers such tools, is representative 
of tools that were used for some years to automatically play 
blackjack and other games offered at a large range of online 
casinos. Blackjack, depending on the precise rules offered, can 
result in a loss of less than 1% of volume on average, and on 
specific games as low as 0.28% [31]. As a result, over any 
significant number of hands, the platform operators were still 
expected to make a profit, and thus at first glance it would seem 
odd that players would wish to automate this and generate higher 
turnover.  
However, from the late 1990s, online casinos were part of a 
rapidly growing and incredibly profitable online sector. To obtain 
and keep customers, casino operators were offering 100% or 
greater bonuses on deposits, with a relatively small turnover 
requirement – often 5 times or less. This meant that a player could 
deposit $100, receive $100 in bonus funds (for a total account of 
$200), play blackjack hands equivalent to $1000, and cash out the 
account. On $1000 of blackjack, at a 1% house advantage the 
average player would lose $10, giving them a profit of $90 on the 
endeavor, which given the number of operators could be repeated 
almost infinitely, providing a steady income. Many did this 
manually, even playing $1 hands to lower the variance, and whilst 
occasionally attempting retrospective action, in general casinos 
did pay out with no or minimal intervention.  
However, some players saw a further opportunity. To make a 
consistent income, minimizing variance was important, and 
playing 1000 $1 hands could often take even an experienced 
player over 2 hours; whilst playing perfect strategy (to keep the 
house advantage under 1%) required significant concentration, 
resulting in this being an extremely tedious activity. Instead, 
players wrote applications to automate the process, an example of 
which is the Casibot software, however a number of private and 
semi-private solutions were developed. These tools evolved to 
become quite advanced, including random mouse movement and 
‘toilet breaks’, could be relied on to play uniformly perfect 
strategy, and required minimal human intervention or effort.  
This, in time, led to an arms race with casinos attempting to detect 
the use of the application, similar to that in recent years between 
CCP and a small number of Eve Online participants, who 
developed and used bots to accrue environmental resources whilst 
the developer, CCP, and player community attempted to detect 
and sanction them. 
The reason I consider this cheating, as opposed to advantage play, 
is that such applications were a clear contravention of the terms of 
service – and one that the community felt reasonable to enforce. 
Thus, the players had gone from advantage play – profitable and 
legal, to cheating – profitable but illegal, however enforcement 
remained problematic. It is this type of distinction that is 
important to consider when evaluating behavior in contemporary 
virtual environments, and key to any eventual attempt to 
implement dispute resolution in such environments. 
6. EVE ONLINE 
This behavior seems particularly problematic for developers. 
Taylor [33, p136] notes a trend amongst developers that “at time 
expresses itself with statement about players ‘not playing right’, 
‘causing trouble’ or ‘ruining gameplay’. In general, there are 
fewer examples of this in Eve Online – the site of my recent 
ethnographic study - than many other environments, as Eve is a 
relatively free-form world in which the developer, CCP, adopt a 
laissez-faire type of regulation; that is – pretty much anything 
goes – within the environment. As mentioned previously, 
however, the caveat is important; the use of external aids to 
automate parts of the in-game experience being seen as 
problematic by CCP just as it previously had by Sony. 
There has been much discussion in the Eve Online community on 
the subject of automation as a form of cheating. During 2011, the 
player-operated blog Eve News 24 published a series of exposes 
on large-scale botting operations, as well as companies operating 
large-scale real-money-trading within the Eve Online 
Environment.  
Whilst real money trading is problematic, and through my 
involvement with the environment it became apparent a 
community norm existed against the activity, it is nonetheless an 
activity from which other participants do not see a direct impact. 
By contrast, botting actively removes resources from the 
environment that other players could obtain, and allows those 
partaking in the activity to quickly accrue more resources than 
other players, and EVE is ultimately a game about controlling 
resources. 
Thus, when Eve News 24 exposed a large real money trading 
operation, IskBank, in EVE, the focus of a large section of the 
community was on how they acquired the resources they sold. In 
theory, the proprietors of the site, and their contacts, could have 
manually participated in the environment themselves or hired 
people to do so, in the fashion of traditional ‘gold farming’ 
operations frequently discussed in the context of World of 
Warcraft. However, experience of the environment led to the 
conclusion that it would be extremely difficult for IskBank to 
acquire the currency at the rate they did, and indeed, in an 
interview with Eve News 24 Vadim, proprietor of IskBank 
admitted using botters [20]. 
Botting (or automated play) takes a number of forms in Eve. One 
such operation is a mining bot, which is tasked with continually 
extracting resources from asteroids or moons, often in a chained 
fashion repeated daily after the resources reset. Another example 
is belt combat bots, which travel from system to system, again 
through a chained path, killing drones and AI agents, collecting 
dropped resources and possibly salvaging the wreckage of the 
ship. Thirdly, there are market bots which, often working in 
conjunction with the other types of bots, but also occasionally 
alone, monitor markets and undercut genuine player offers by 
0.01 ISK, guaranteeing the best price for resources.  
All of these, and indeed all forms of automation, are in breach of 
CCP’s terms of service. CCP Spitfire [5], writing on the EVE 
forums, commented “Any means to automate the gameplay in 
EVE Online directly violate our terms of service, and (regardless 
of what someone might have told you) such behavior is not 
tolerated.” and CCP developer Pollux [4], in a developer blog, 
commented “One particular type of cheating that the ESTF [Eve 
Security Task Force] has been focusing its attention on is 
programs that automate EVE's gameplay on behalf of a player, or 
bots. In the past months of our war against the bots, we have been 
constantly identifying and tracking players using different types of 
bots, enforcing our policies and giving them their time off from 
New Eden”. 
During the EVE News 24 investigation, the community blog 
conducted a number of interviews with players who had 
participated in the activity. Fred [14], who claims to have “never 
cheated in a game ever prior to this, not even considered it”, 
considered that botting was so prevalent within Eve that he had 
suffered an “attitude wear”, and investigated botting; after starting 
to use the software, he noted that botting paid for his accounts and 
kept him able to compete at a high-level within the environment. 
He comments, “I’m pretty sure that the average user do as I do. 
We use bots as a mean to pay for our accounts, and to get what we 
need without spending hours on hours to grind for it”. As was the 
case with all of these accounts, the story met with an 
overwhelmingly negative reaction from the Eve News 24 
community, with comments such as “go play something else and 
fuck that game up if you want to bot, at least on those games, 
you're not fucking up the entire economy in your efforts to 
automate winning”. 
Both McAdams [22] and Strandburg [32] suggest this is expected 
behavior when participants feel that rules or norms are not being 
enforced. Indeed, such behavior also mirrors Ostrom’s [27] theory 
of ‘memory loss’. In the past, rules against botting had been 
enforced, however due to staff re-organization there was “a period 
of time where nobody had responsibility for handling the 
technology responsible for nuking botters” [20]. In time, this led 
to the type of ‘memory loss’ outlined by Fred. 
Records obtained during the community investigation show Paul 
[28] to have been a regular customer of Iskbank. Paul wanted to 
acquire ISK to pay for equipment and resources within the 
environment to progress his character. Subsequently, he wanted 
ISK to fund market speculation – either arbitrage (different prices 
for items in different regions of space) or predicting that a game 
change or other development will lead to a change in resources 
value making it profitable to stockpile and then sell items. For 
Paul, Iskbank was simply a cheaper way to acquire ISK. He 
commented, “It’s simple, really. ISK is cheaper thank (sic) PLEX, 
and PLEX is just a legalized way of buying ISK”. Over the course 
of several months, Paul spent more than $1,000 on ISK. Asked if 
he’d been caught, he replied, “Nope. If I did [get caught], I doubt 
I’d continue.” 
Both of these accounts indicate a lack of clarity amongst players 
as to where the line was drawn between accepted behavior which 
some members of the community perceive as cheating (such as the 
buying of in-game currency for real world money), and that which 
the platform operator perceives as cheating (the use of bots, or 
acquiring in-game currency from a source other then themselves). 
Additionally, they show the role both community norms and 
codified rules, and there enforcement have in shaping 
environmental behavior; in this case the other community 
members were able to have players stop participating in such 
activities before the platform operator were able to, and at least a 
portion of the blame for the participants behaving in such ways to 
begin with can be attributed to platform operator inaction. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The differentiation between cheating and advantage play, as 
applied to contemporary online environments, seems supported by 
both traditional play literature and contemporary designer 
accounts. Whilst it is primarily a distinction of terminology, 
loosening the rhetoric around cheating to me seems advantageous. 
We can essentially divide play approaches into three styles; 
developer-approved, advantage play and cheating. By doing so, 
we can closely align disputes arising within online gaming 
environments to those in the last 10 years of offshore gambling, 
making use of precedents and resolution strategies where 
appropriate.  
Koster [19], whose work on both cheating and players natural 
inclination to seek advantage I discussed previously, also includes 
a rule stating that “No matter what you do, someone is going to 
automate the process of playing your world, and that “Looking at 
what parts of your game players tend to automate is a good way to 
determine which parts of the game are tedious and/or not fun.”   
Given this, it seems inevitable that similar challenges to those 
discussed above are likely to be experienced in other online 
environments as the industry continues to develop. As we are 
beginning to see with ‘Complete Gacha’ in Asia [29], in which 
certain gaming mechanics have been determined to be gambling, 
and are being legislated as such, as well as in the move of social 
networks towards having games with the option to spend real 
world currency for in-game rewards, such environments are likely 
to face increasing regulatory interest. Additionally, the increasing 
prominence of real money as both an input and output in these 
environments is likely to lead to participants continuing to search 
for ways to profit from the environments.  
As such, the distinction between cheating and advantage play is 
likely to become ever more blurred, and terms and conditions ever 
more specific to counter such styles of participation. Additionally, 
however, participants are likely to seek increased protection for 
acts that they consider within the terms of service at the time they 
were performed and which led to realizing a profit from the 
environment, causing an increased need for dispute resolution and 
determinations made as to whether specific behavior is fair or 
foul. Advantage play provides us with a term to categorize 
behavior which the platform operator may not encourage, but is 
not in breach of their terms and so should not be sanctionable 
behavior, whilst additionally providing us with a constant 
reminder that players will always seek out optimal play styles, and 
whether developer or regulator, it is important to be aware of such 
participants. 
Whilst participants certainly care if others cheat [8], it is once 
when we begin to see real world consequences that governments 
and other regulatory bodies become interested in the space, and 
where a form of regulation outside of the game space becomes 
significant. In both the offshore gambling industry and 
contemporary online environments, there is geographical disparity 
amongst users, a lack of dispute resolution or enforcement options 
between customer service departments and the courts, a continual 
supply of disputes, and often significant issues with terms of 
service documents, particularly in cases where the codified rules 
differ from the community norms. In these spaces then there 
remains an argument for such a service to be provided, whether 
that is through pressure brought by the player base or through 
some mode of self-regulation. 
 Whatever definition of cheating one ultimately prefers, these 
are clearly issues on which the community, and perhaps best the 
community, is able to adjudicate. For it is the community which 
best understands the practices which have become commonplace, 
the precedents set in the past by the developers, and the norms 
which are established.  
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